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Custom encompasses many different things, from regularly occurring 
industry practices, to social norms, to ongoing practices that have existed from time 
“immemorial.” Custom in all these senses has had a tremendous influence on 
intellectual property (“IP”) law, from affecting what happens outside of the courts 
in the trenches of the creative, technology, and science-based industries, to 
influencing how courts analyze infringement and defenses in IP cases. For decades, 
many scholars overlooked or dismissed the impact of custom on IP law in large part 
because of a belief that the dominant statutory frameworks that govern IP left little 
room for custom to play a role (Long, 2004, p. 484; Carter, 1992, p. 131). In the 
last ten years, however, the landscape has shifted and more attention has been given 
to considering how custom affects IP entitlements both outside and inside the 
courtroom. Scholars like myself have brought attention to the profound impact 
custom has in IP. My work has particularly focused on the theoretical frames that 
inform the incorporation of custom into the law, as well as on documenting some 
of the practices and norms of various communities that use IP (Rothman, 2007).  
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the role of custom in IP, and the 
scholarship in the field. I first situate the discussion in the broader context of the 
treatment of custom outside of IP, and then consider some of the dominant practices 
and norms within IP, focusing particularly on those involved in copyright law. I 
discuss the incorporation of custom by the courts and criticize the often unreflected 
reliance on custom. After providing this background, I question the relevance of 
most customs to set legal standards in IP disputes, and suggest limits on custom’s 
role in IP cases. Finally, I suggest implications that flow from this analysis, as well 
as recommend future areas of research for scholars. 
 
I. THE ROLE OF CUSTOM OUTSIDE IP 
 
To understand the role of custom in IP, one must first contextualize the 
treatment of custom in the law more broadly. The importance of custom in 
                                                 
* © 2017 Jennifer E. Rothman. I consider many of the issues raised in this chapter in greater detail 
in “The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property,” 93 Virginia Law Review 1899 (2007). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028185
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028185 
DRAFT – Revised as of August 28, 2017 
Forthcoming in Research Handbook -- Economics of Intellectual Property – 
Volume I: Theory—Eds. Peter Menell & Ben Depoorter  




determining governing law has a long tradition in Anglo-American law. One of the 
foundational features of English common law was its use of custom to set legal 
rules. Prior to the institution of an organized legal system, practices and norms 
regulated local behavior and facilitated the resolution of disputes. As more formal 
legal systems developed in England, custom shaped and sometimes defined the law. 
The incorporation of custom by courts served an important role in getting 
communities to support the authority of the growing judiciary.   
Under common law dating back to at least the late 1400s in England, 
“general customs” formed the basis of the law. William Blackstone (1765), one of 
the foremost commentators on the early common law, defined the common law in 
his influential 18th century Commentaries on the Laws of England as “[t]hat ancient 
collection of unwritten maxims and customs [that] had subsisted immemorially.” 
The two main advantages of using longstanding community customs (either local 
or kingdom-wide) were that they were thought to be “universally known” and were 
viewed as originating with the communities and people rather than being imposed 
by the king. Communities therefore were more willing to defer to custom-based 
legal rules that largely reflected their prior understanding of appropriate conduct 
(pp. *17, *45, *63-64, *67-68, *76-78; Baker, 2002, pp. 1-10; Postema, 1986, pp. 
3-4). 
Much of the Blackstonian discussion of custom focused on its role in 
defining the scope of public use and access rights to private land. In contrast to 
property doctrines like prescription, custom permitted access and use not by a 
particular person but by the public at large. In a number of instances, the public 
obtained access and use rights to private property on the basis of prior customary 
uses of that land. English courts held that the public could hold annual dances, 
conduct horse races, play cricket, fish, gather wood, and graze animals on private 
lands because they had customarily used the land for those purposes (Blackstone, 
1765, *76-78; Rose, 1986, pp. 739-41, 758-59). Carol Rose has described some of 
these customary uses as “recreational” in nature and preferred because they 
supported social engagement and connections within a community (Rose, 1986, pp. 
723, 767-70, 779-81).  
Many of the customary uses were also related to providing basic subsistence 
needs. During the enclosure movement in England beginning in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, landowners increasingly excluded citizens from land that 
they had previously relied on for food and fuel. The English historian E.P. 
Thompson (1991) describes custom during this period as a response to this 
enclosure of the land. The customary use arguments challenged efforts by property 
owners to move property in the direction of a virtually absolute right of the 
landowners with no permissible public use or access (pp. 106-84). 
Rather than being the preferred starting point for legal rules, today the status 
of custom is contested and debated. Different areas of law (and different inquiries 
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within those areas) treat custom differently. In tort law, for example, there are 
longstanding debates about whether the development of customary safety 
precautions by a particular industry should be an absolute defense to tort liability, 
no defense at all, or simply some evidence of negligence or lack thereof. The 
dominant contemporary principle is that custom should be some evidence of 
reasonable care, but not its measure. (The T.J. Hooper, 1932; Landes and Posner, 
1987, pp. 132-33; Epstein, 1992a; Morris, 1942). In contract law, there is a 
developed literature analyzing whether industry practices should be read into 
contracts as implied terms and also, less controversially, whether such practices 
should inform the interpretation of existing contract terms (Bernstein, 1999; 
Epstein, 1999). In property law, custom primarily arises as a basis to assert public 
access to land that has long been used despite competing private property claims, 
often in the context of beaches (Thornton v. Hay, 1969, pp. 676-78; Rose, 1986, 
pp. 713-14). 
Scholars who have considered custom and the law largely have focused on 
how custom can govern various communities without regard to formal laws or 
adjudicatory mechanisms. Robert Ellickson’s (1991) influential book Order 
without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes considered the ranching practices of 
cattle ranchers in Northern California, and determined that social norms and 
longstanding practices trumped more formal legal rules and discouraged resort to 
the legal system. The political scientist Elinor Ostrom (1990), in her book 
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 
similarly analyzed the way various communities develop systems of self-
government and self-organization to manage and control the use of common-pool 
resources. Lisa Bernstein (1992; 2001), in a series of articles, documented a variety 
of industry practices that govern relationships in different commercial fields, 
including the diamond and cotton industries. 
Over the last decade, scholars have begun to recognize that IP is not an 
exception to these narratives about custom, but instead yet another example of the 
influence of custom on both de facto and de jure rights. Custom has a powerful 
impact on what is happening in the trenches of creative and other IP-dominated 
industries and also influences the governing legal regimes. Just as the enclosure 
movement in England sparked arguments in favor of granting customary use rights 
to the public, concerns over the increased propertization of intangible works that 
can form crucial pieces of our identities and culture has generated efforts to 
articulate similar justifications for public use of these works.  
 
II. INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND SOCIAL NORMS IN THE IP SPACE 
 
 Numerous industry practices and norms govern how IP and quasi-IP rights 
function as a de facto matter. In copyright law, custom has affected determinations 
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of authorship, ownership, copyrightability (such as whether something is original), 
and whether a use is infringing—especially whether something is an idea or 
expression, or a scène à faire (an unprotectable stock or commonplace element). 
Uncertainties in IP law incentivize the creation of custom. Some of this uncertainty 
is generated by the significant impact that changing technology has had on the 
production and distribution of IP. Other uncertainties in IP law are generated by 
flexible, and sometimes unpredictable, legal standards. The best example of this is 
copyright’s fair use defense. A four-factor analysis is used to evaluate whether a 
use is fair and therefore not infringing. The multi-factor analysis has often been 
criticized as “muddled,” “troublesome,” and “ad hoc.” (Weinreb, 1990, pp. 1138-
40; Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. 1939, p. 662; Leval, 1990, p. 1105). Because 
of the unpredictability and expense of litigating fair use defenses, many players in 
the IP industries prefer to agree among themselves on some boundaries of fair use 
or play it safe by conforming to industry practices, such as licensing, rather than 
risk adverse court decisions if they guess wrong about a potential fair use 
(Rothman, 2014, pp. 1602-05). I consider a variety of practices that have developed 
in the IP space, particularly those that have arisen in the context of copyright law, 
and the navigation of its fair use defense. 
 
A. Informal Industry Practices and Social Norms 
 
1. Clearance Culture 
 
 One of the most influential set of practices is the common licensing of 
works, marks, inventions, and identities. Producers, publishers, and distributors 
often require creators and inventors to license or “clear” all potentially protected 
IP, even when there are strong defenses for the use of works, trademarks, or 
inventions, or when the protectability of the work, mark, or invention at issue is 
questionable. Instead of challenging the validity of the copyright, trademark, or 
patent, or relying on fair use, First Amendment, or other defenses, IP users often 
seek clearance. Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi (2004) have dubbed this 
preference for licensing the “clearance culture.” (p. 22; Heins and Beckles, 2005, 
pp. 5-6). The clearance culture is primarily motivated by efforts to avoid litigation 
and operates without regard to what IP law requires or what, as a normative matter, 
should be protected by IP rights. As the Sixth Circuit has observed, it is “cheaper 
to license than to litigate” (Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 2005, p. 802). 
When works, marks, or people’s identities cannot be licensed, gatekeepers often 
demand their removal.   
These clearance practices are firmly entrenched in all media, including 
music, fine arts, and publishing. Clearance culture can be seen, for example, in 
limits on the content of biographies. Even though courts have traditionally given 
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great latitude to authors to refer to individuals, trademarks, and copyrighted works 
without permission in historical, nonfiction works, publishers routinely demand 
clearance of a subject’s copyrights, trademarks, and publicity rights (Max , 2006, 
pp. 34, 37-38). Many of the potential IP claims in such circumstances are facially 
meritless, but risk-averse publishers and authors nevertheless abandon projects or 
follow the restrictions set forth by alleged property holders (Max, 2006, pp. 34, 37-
38; Max, 2007, pp. 54, 66). The film and television industry similarly clears 
potentially copyrighted or trademarked works or marks, as well as images and 
references to individuals, especially well-known public figures, even when the uses 
would likely be determined fair if litigated (Rothman, 2007, pp. 1912-15). Inventors 
and developers also often license patents when the validity of a patent is 
questionable or the infringing status of an inventor’s product is uncertain. 
Companies license to avoid costly patent litigation and hold-up problems with a 
product that has already been developed or marketed (Farrell and Merges, 2004, 
pp. 955-60; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007, pp. 1992-93). 
Clearance culture practices have a profound influence on what gets made 
and the content of such works. When licensing is not an option, either because it is 
cost-prohibitive or an IP owner does not like the way its IP will be used, creators 
and inventors often alter their works or forgo some projects altogether. Clearance 
culture practices are enforced extra-judicially by fear of litigation costs, in-house 
policies mandating clearance, concerns over forfeiting large investment or start-up 
costs, and by limits on funding, insurance, and distribution.  
 
2. IP-Adjacent Norms 
 
Several recent scholarly works have analyzed communities in which 
traditional IP law does not function well or participants choose not to pursue legal 
remedies, even when they are available. Much of this literature focuses on 
critiquing the incentive rationale for protecting IP by demonstrating that creative 
works and inventions are produced in the absence of IP protection (Raustiala and 
Sprigman, 2006). But this scholarship also reveals the myriad ways in which 
communities can erect customary protections for creative and inventive works 
outside the judicial system and enforce them using community norms. 
Economists Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von Hippel (2008) have 
documented norms to protect food recipes in the absence of effective formal IP law. 
They found that a variety of customs govern French chefs, including norms that the 
chefs should not copy or share recipes without permission. The chefs also 
encourage and seek attribution for their recipes and innovations. Shaming and 
ostracizing serve to enforce these norms. Christopher Sprigman and Dotan Oliar 
(2008) have identified similar practices in the world of stand-up comedy. They 
found norms that discourage joke-stealing and encourage originality. These norms 
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are enforced by obstructing employment, shaming, and the occasional use of 
violence. David Fagundes (2012) has studied norms surrounding the adoption and 
policing of roller derby names using a master roster kept by community members 
and enforced by positive reinforcement and shaming. Drawing on the work of 
Elinor Ostrom in the world of common-pool resources, Brett Frischmann, Michael 
Madison and Katherine Strandburg (2010) have surveyed a variety of IP-based 
communities, such as those that use open-source software, or that contribute to 
Wikipedia and the Associated Press. They identify practices that help manage these 
“cultural commons.” 
Norms governing the use of IP have also developed in a variety of 
subcultures that rely on uses of others’ IP. In the world of online fan fiction, for 
example, norms require that attribution be given when material is borrowed from 
another fan’s website. Copyright laws have little sway in fan-fiction communities. 
Instead, fan-fiction authors conform to their own social norms, such as that the sites 
be nonprofit, add creative material to the original material, and provide appropriate 
credit. Deviation from the fan fiction norms may lead to shaming within that 
subculture, which is usually enough of a deterrent to keep the norms intact 
(Tushnet, 2007).  
 
B. Formalized Practices and Guidelines 
 
More formal customary practices have also been used in an effort to avoid 
litigation. Many of these guidelines and agreements have developed in the context 
of copyright’s fair use doctrine. Some industries and user groups have sought to 
insulate themselves from liability for copyright infringement by agreeing in a more 
formal manner to a set of standard copying practices. I highlight some of the most 
influential of these policies, guidelines, and “best practices” statements. 
 
1. Classroom Guidelines 
 
 The most influential of the extra-legal copyright guidelines is the 
“Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational 
Institutions,” commonly referred to as the “Classroom Guidelines.” While drafting 
the fair use section of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress recruited industry 
representatives, in particular publishers, to develop their own guidelines for what 
constituted fair use of writings and music in educational settings. The chairman and 
other members of the subcommittee working on the copyright revision “urged the 
parties to meet together independently in an effort to achieve a meeting of the minds 
as to permissible educational uses of copyrighted material” (H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, p. 67). Congress contended that “workable voluntary arrangements” were the 
preferable solution to questions regarding the scope of fair use, at least in the 
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context of educational uses. (H.R. Rep. No. 90-83, pp. 33, 36; H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, pp. 67-68). 
 The Classroom Guidelines take a narrow view of what sort of uses of 
copyrighted works are permissible in the educational context. The Guidelines 
provide that single copies may be made for or by teachers for use in teaching or 
research. These copies are limited to those of “a chapter from a book, an article 
from a periodical or newspaper, a short story, short essay or short poem [and a] 
chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture from a book, periodical or 
newspaper.” Multiple copies, not exceeding one copy per enrolled student, are 
permitted under limited circumstances in which such uses meet tests for brevity, 
spontaneity, and cumulative effect. Brevity is defined as less than 250 words of a 
poem and 500-2500 words of a prose work. The copies must also include a notice 
of copyright (H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 68-69). Although the Guidelines purport 
to set forth the minimum allowable uses, many universities, other educational 
institutions, and libraries have followed them as if they represent the maximum 
allowable uses (Rothman, 2007, pp. 1920-22). Many universities have handed out 
the Guidelines to their professors and mandated conformity with them. In 2006, 
William W. Fisher and William McGeveran (2006) have estimated that 80% of 
American universities comply with the Guidelines (p. 57). Recently, a few 
universities have moved away from this conservative approach. The University of 
Minnesota, for example, recently agreed to defend professors if they reasonably 
believe that their use of a copyrighted work is fair, even if the use exceeds the 
Classroom Guidelines (University of Minnesota, 2017). At the beginning of 2014, 
New York University also withdrew its requirement that faculty comply with the 
Classroom Guidelines and now allows its faculty to conduct an independent fair 
use analysis (Compare New York University, 2014 with New York University, 
1983). 
 
2. In-House Guidelines 
 
Many companies and organizations have developed internal guidelines that 
govern the treatment of IP within their own institutions. In both the public and 
private sectors, guidelines have been developed to control internal copying and the 
use of others’ inventions, works, marks, and identities. The clearance practices that 
occur as an informal practice are often specifically mandated by in-house 
guidelines. In the film and television industry, for example, networks, studios, and 
production companies develop “Standards and Practices” which control content, 
including the use of copyrightable works, trademarks, names, and images. Most 
film studios mandate the clearance of all copyrighted works regardless of the 
manner in which they appear, the elimination of any references to trademarks in 
dialogue, the removal of or blurring of trademarks that appear on screen, and the 
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clearance or removal of proper names. Many libraries also have developed in-house 
guidelines to regulate photocopying, inter-library loans, and journal purchases. The 
primary purpose of these guidelines is to reduce the likelihood of a lawsuit, and, if 
sued, to reduce the likelihood of findings of bad faith or “willfulness” on the basis 
of compliance with such internal guidelines. In the context of the entertainment 
industry, some of these practices also facilitate product placement and advertising 
deals. (Rothman, 2007, p. 1922.) 
 
3. Best Practices Statements 
 
 Scholars and various use communities have recently sought out custom as 
a way to define and establish fair use. This interest in custom is not only driven by 
efforts to persuade courts to accept defenses in individual cases, but also by efforts 
to encourage individuals and organizations to assert fair use rather than to conform 
with the dominant, risk-averse clearance culture. Most notably, the best practices 
statements developed by Peter Jaszi, Patricia Aufderheide, and others at American 
University and its Center for Social Media seek to establish boundaries of fair use 
in the context of communities that frequently use copyrighted works owned by 
others.  
The Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices (“Filmmakers’ 
Statement”) (2005) is the most well known of these statements. This statement was 
the first one released by the Center and sets forth categories of uses of others’ 
copyrighted works that its drafters consider fair in the context of documentary 
films. The privileged categories are critique or commentary, illustrative quoting, 
incidental uses (those captured during the filming process), and uses in historical 
sequences. Each of these categories contains a number of “limitations.” In the 
context of the illustrative category―in which uses are generally considered fair if 
the use “illustrate[s] an argument or point”―such preferred uses are limited to 
instances in which documentarians “assure that the material is properly attributed . 
. . [; that] quotations are drawn from a range of different sources[; that] each 
quotation . . . is no longer than is necessary to achieve the intended effect; [and that] 
the quoted material is not employed merely in order to avoid the cost or 
inconvenience of shooting equivalent footage.” These and the other limitations 
dramatically contract the scope of permissible uses under these statements. 
 The Filmmakers’ Statement appears to have encouraged more reliance on 
fair use. After its adoption, various film industry gatekeepers, such as Errors & 
Omissions (“E & O”) insurers and production companies, reconsidered their 
policies and have become more willing to insure and distribute documentary films 
that have not licensed all copyrighted material used in the films (Aufderheide and 
Jaszi, 2007). It is difficult, however, to know exactly how much influence the 
statements had, given that a number of other changes in the IP landscape occurred 
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during this same time period. For example, legal clinics at major law schools and 
nonprofit organizations offered to provide free legal representation to those 
asserting fair use, and advocacy groups lobbied E & O companies to change their 
procedures. (Rothman, 2010a).  
 
4. Creative Commons 
 
Some efforts to encourage the use of copyrighted works have focused on 
creators, rather than users. A subsection of creators prefer a more permissive 
copyright regime than the default—one that makes it easier for third-parties to use 
and share works. One of the most successful of these creator-focused efforts is 
Creative Commons, a nonprofit organization formed in 2001 with the idea of 
layering an alternative, formalized licensing regime on top of existing copyright 
law. Hundreds of millions of works have been licensed using Creative Commons 
licenses. Major bands and recording artists, such as Nine Inch Nails and David 
Byrne, have used these licenses, as have Al Jazeera, Google, the California Digital 
Open Source Library, and the White House. (Brief of Amici Curiae Creative 
Commons et al. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Jacobsen v. Katzer, pp. 1-2; 
Creative Commons, 2015; Rothman, 2014, p. 1625. The most common Creative 
Commons licenses require attribution, but allow noncommercial derivative works 
or adaptations if the new work is distributed in a share-alike manner—meaning 
under the same Creative Commons licensing regime under which it is licensed 
(Creative Commons, 2015). Thus, these licenses alter the usual baseline of 
copyright protection which does not require attribution for uses to be determined 
fair, and does not allow uses of noncommercial works that do not otherwise meet 
the criteria for finding that they are a fair use of the work. 
 
III. THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN FORMAL LAW 
 
 These customary practices have not only affected how things operate on the 
ground, but also the formal law, largely by influencing courts in IP cases. Courts 
often point to nonconformity with industry practices as a basis to find infringement 
or to reject defenses to infringement. Only rarely have courts referred to conformity 
with industry practices as a possible basis for a defense. When courts incorporate 
custom, either implicitly or explicitly, they often use customary practices as proxies 
for other considerations, such as what constitutes a “reasonable” or “ethical” use of 
another’s IP or what will be the market impact of allowing such uses. I consider 
here the primary ways that courts use custom when deciding IP issues, and raise 
some concerns with the current treatment of custom. 
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A. Custom as Evidence of Market Effects, Commerciality, and Damages 
 
Courts often consider what is customarily done as evidence of whether there 
is a negative market effect caused by the use of another’s IP. The most prominent 
example of this is when courts look at “customary pricing” in evaluating 
copyright’s fair use defense. Two of the four statutory factors for determining fair 
use involve consideration of the market for a copyrighted work. The first factor 
looks at the character of the use and in particular whether the use is commercial. A 
nonprofit or noncommercial use weighs in favor of a finding of fair use, while a 
commercial use weighs against such a finding. The fourth enumerated factor also 
considers the market by asking courts to consider how the relevant use will affect 
the market for the copyrighted work (17 U.S.C. § 107). Courts view both existing 
and potential licensing markets as an indication of whether a use is for profit (or 
“commercial”) and also whether a given use is likely to harm the market for the 
work at issue. Courts have sometimes used custom to determine the existence of 
such markets. 
In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television (1997), for example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a fair use defense when a 
television sitcom used the plaintiff’s artwork in the background of a set without 
permission. The court pointed to the custom in the TV and film industries of 
licensing copyrighted works used as set-dressing. If not for the consideration of 
these industry clearance practices, Black Entertainment Television (“BET”) had a 
convincing fair use defense—the poster containing the plaintiff’s artwork was 
visible for less than thirty seconds, was never the focus of any shot, and was not 
referred to in the dialogue. The Ringgold court, however, concluded that BET had 
failed to pay the “customary price” for using Ringgold’s work by not licensing her 
art and therefore could not avail itself of the fair use defense. 
Courts have relied on similar industry licensing practices to evaluate the 
legitimacy of photocopying for educational and research purposes. In Princeton 
University Press v. Michigan Document Services (1996), the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected a fair use defense in the context of university course packets in 
large part because the defendant did not follow the industry practice of licensing 
works used in such packets. Similarly, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco 
(1994), the Second Circuit rejected Texaco’s fair use defense largely because of 
noncompliance with industry custom. The court was persuaded that the copying of 
journal articles by Texaco’s research scientists was unfair at least in part because 
many major corporations got licenses for similar copying. Nonconformity with 
industry practices in both cases convinced the courts that the uses were commercial 
and caused market harm. 
These courts’ analyses stem in part from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (1985). In Harper & Row, 
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the Court concluded that: “[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not 
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to 
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary 
price” (p. 562). When a defendant is found to have not paid the “customary price,” 
the defendant’s use is often judged “unfair.”  
There are numerous problems with relying on the customary pricing 
analysis. The fact that licensing may be common should not be used to determine 
that a use is for profit. Even “educational” and religious uses can be viewed by 
courts as commercial under such a “customary price” analysis (Soc’y of Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery v. Gregory, 2012, p. 61; Cambridge Univ. Press v. 
Patton, 2014, pp. 1261-68). Several scholars, including myself, and a number of 
jurists have criticized this reliance on licensing evidence and have warned of the 
circularity dangers inherent in considering licensing opportunities as a basis for 
market harm. If a use is fair, there will be no licensing market, and if a use is not 
fair, a licensing market will develop. When courts rely on such licensing markets, 
particularly in an era of clearance culture, they abdicate their role as independent 
evaluators of what uses are fair (Rothman, 2007, pp. 1933-34; Princeton Univ. 
Press, pp. 1397, 1400-04, 1407-10; Am. Geophysical Union, pp. 929 n.17, 931, 
936-39; Gibson, 2007, pp. 895-98; Pallas Loren, 1997, pp. 38-41). 
 
B. Custom as a Proxy for What Should Be Done 
 
Courts often view failure to conform with industry practices as both 
unethical and unfair. In Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS (1980, 
1982), both a district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that failing 
to license film clips when it is industry custom to do so was unethical and a basis 
for rejecting both fair use and First Amendment defenses to copyright infringement. 
In Roy Export, CBS aired a retrospective on the great film actor and director Charlie 
Chaplin soon after his death. CBS incorporated in its broadcast footage from 
Chaplin’s films. In upholding a $700,000 jury verdict against CBS, the district court 
found persuasive the fact that “CBS’ conduct violated not only its own guidelines 
but also industry standards of ethical behavior.” The court pointed to the industry’s 
licensing practices as evidence of harm to the potential market for the plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works and of “bad faith.” (1980, pp. 1146-47). Although the issue of 
fair use was not raised on appeal, the Second Circuit, in affirming the district court 
decision, pointed to CBS’s violation of its in-house guidelines and industry 
licensing practices as evidence of “commercial immorality” and a basis for rejecting 
its First Amendment defense against unfair competition and copyright infringement 
claims (1982, pp. 1100, 1105 (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court in Harper & 
Row cited Roy Export when it set forth its “customary price” standard, suggesting 
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that the customary price analysis is more of a normative concept than an economic 
one (p. 562). 
 Even though the Classroom Guidelines are not legally binding and were 
intended to state a minimum floor of allowable educational uses of copyrighted 
works, courts have often viewed copying exceeding the Guidelines as unfair and 
done in bad faith. In Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics (1991), a federal district court 
considered the copy shop Kinko’s infringement in bad faith partly because Kinko’s 
in-house handbook conceded that its copying practices for course packets exceeded 
those permissible under the Guidelines (pp. 1544-45).  
 Defendants are also sometimes found to have acted willfully or recklessly 
when they fail to conform with customary practices. Such findings can generate 
higher statutory damages, punitive damages, and possibly criminal liability under 
U.S. copyright laws. By contrast, conformity with custom often provides a basis for 
a finding of good faith even if infringement is ultimately found, thereby limiting 
damages and avoiding the danger of criminal penalties. 
 
C. Custom as a Proxy for What Is Reasonable 
 
It is not easy to define what constitutes a reasonable use of another’s IP. A 
reasonable use is not the same as a just or moral use; instead, like the reasonable 
person standard in tort law, such a consideration asks more generally what is 
appropriate in a given circumstance. Because it is difficult to determine when a use 
of another’s IP is reasonable, courts often use custom as a shortcut or proxy for 
such a determination. Nowhere is this approach more evident than in copyright’s 
fair use doctrine. The traditional common law fair use standard asked courts to 
evaluate whether a use was “reasonable and customary” (Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 1934, p. 42; Harper & Row, p. 550; De Wolf, 1925, p. 
143). Although this traditional formulation of fair use asks courts to consider both 
what is reasonable and what is customary, modern courts often conflate the two 
inquiries so that what is customary becomes what is reasonable.  
Courts have judged uses fair solely on the basis that such uses have 
customarily been practiced. This approach turns on a court’s conclusion that a use 
that has long been allowed is reasonable. One example of this analysis is the 
common acceptance of the use of copyrighted works in biographical works because 
such uses are considered “customary” (New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 
1990, p. 157; Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 1966, p. 307). Another area 
where courts have relied on custom is in the context of copyright’s work-for-hire 
doctrine. Many universities expressly allow faculty members to retain copyrights 
over their lectures, course materials, and scholarly works. In the few instances in 
which such faculty ownership has been contested, courts have often  concluded that 
such ownership is an appropriate exception to the usual work-for-hire rules given 
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the longstanding nature and commonality of the norm allowing faculty to retain 
such rights (Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 1988, pp. 416-17; Weinstein v. Univ. of 
Ill., 1987, p. 1094; but see Forasté v. Brown Univ., 2003, pp. 238-39; Pittsburg 
State Univ. v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 2005, pp. 345-47). Courts have also looked to 
customary practices as an indication of what uses reasonable authors would permit 
of their works―a consideration that some courts treat as highly indicative of 
whether a use is fair (Harper & Row, pp. 550-51). 
 
D. Custom as Evidence of What Is Usually Done 
 
Sometimes courts look at evidence of custom simply to determine what is 
usually done in a particular industry without using custom for second-order 
evaluations of what is reasonable, ethical, or optimal. A number of legal issues in 
IP law legitimately require consideration of industry practices. For example, 
whether something is an unprotectable scène á faire—a common stock or standard 
element—is driven in part by customary practices. Whether one can use copyright 
law to protect characters that are mutant superheroes with special powers turns on 
the conventions of the superhero genre. Because it is customary for superheroes to 
have such qualities, a copyright holder cannot prevent others from also creating 
superheroes who are mutants with extraordinary powers. (Twentieth Century Fox 
Film v. Marvel Enters., 2001, pp. 37-38, 42-43). Similarly, in the context of 
computer software, the doctrine of externalities denies copyright protection to 
aspects of software that are standard programming features. Custom determines 
what programming practices are considered standard programming features. (Dun 
& Bradstreet Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, 2002, pp. 214-16; Computer 
Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 1992, pp. 709-10). Custom also matters in trademark 
infringement and false endorsement cases, which turn on consumer confusion. 
Consumer perceptions about whether permission is usually required for a particular 
use of a trademark or celebrity name will likely influence whether consumers will 
think the use was sponsored or endorsed.  
 
E. Custom as Evidence of What Parties Intended 
 
Finally, courts consider custom when determining parties’ intentions in 
explicit and implied contracts related to IP rights, in claim construction of patents, 
and when interpreting statutory language (May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 
1980, pp. 1367-68; Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 1997, pp. 262, 
267-77, 282, 285-86 & n.6, 288-90). Such straightforward uses of custom are 
appropriate and not controversial (Rothman, 2007, pp. 1945-1946, 1974, 1978-
1979). 
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IV. QUESTIONING RELIANCE ON CUSTOM 
 
Given courts frequent consideration and incorporation of custom, it is 
important to consider both whether and when it is appropriate to rely on industry 
practices and social norms to determine the scope of IP rights. Three main 
justifications have been advanced for incorporating custom into other areas of the 
law: First, that a given industry can best determine its optimal governing rules; 
second, that incorporating custom fulfills parties’ expectations; and finally, that 
individuals or industries should establish their own rules to further their autonomy-
based interests. To the extent that these are legitimate bases to incorporate custom 
elsewhere, they are less convincing in the context of IP. I will briefly consider each 
of these justifications, and how well they fit with considerations in the IP realm. 
 
A. The Questionable Optimality of Industry-Driven IP Practices 
 
If an industry or community is likely to establish optimal practices, or at 
least rules preferable to those that would independently develop in the courts or 
through legislation, it makes sense to defer to industry practices. In the IP context, 
however, practices are likely to develop in suboptimal ways and ultimately be 
inferior to court or legislative resolutions. 
Defining what is meant by optimal practices in the context of IP is 
challenging. Nevertheless, any IP regime requires a balancing of IP owners’ 
interests and those of users. The incentive rationale (one of the primary 
justifications for IP) has a built-in argument for allowing access to and use of works. 
Under the incentive-rationale theory, copyrightable and patentable works, 
inventions, and discoveries are protected in part to encourage their production and 
distribution. This justification rests not on authorial or inventor rights, but instead 
on the encouragement of production for the public’s benefit. Under this rubric, IP 
ownership rights should not be absolute, because then the goal of promoting 
broader progress for the public good would be thwarted. The incentive rationale 
also has a built-in ceiling—there is no need to provide additional protection once 
no further incentive to produce is created. Accordingly, fulfilling the goals of the 
incentive rationale requires consideration of the interests of both IP creators and 
users. 
Moral and personality-based justifications for IP protection also require the 
allowance of some use of others’ copyrighted works both for creative, artistic 
purposes, and because users and subsequent creators have their own personality-
based interests in using others’ IP to adequately express themselves and to describe 
their own reality (Rothman, 2010b). When the integrity of the underlying work is 
not damaged and the creator’s interests are satisfied through attribution, these 
personality-based approaches encourage the use of others’ IP.  
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Perhaps a pure labor-reward rationale—based solely on compensating 
creators or distributors—would exclude all uses done without permission if it were 
the only justification for IP laws. But it is not a stand-alone theory. In addition, 
under the logic of the labor-reward rubric, users who exercise their own labor when 
reworking others’ creations and inventions, should reap the rewards of their own 
labor. Even if a labor-reward analysis adequately explained IP laws and was the 
only justification for such laws, IP rights must still be limited by free speech, free 
expression, and liberty interests. Accordingly, some uses of others IP would be 
allowed. 
The question then of how best to allocate IP centers on whether a 
decentralized, industry-governed IP system is likely to adequately incentivize the 
production and distribution of inventions and works and protect and reward authors 
and inventors, while at the same time guaranteeing adequate use and access to 
other’s IP by authors, inventors, and the public. Trademark protection similarly 
must balance the protection of businesses’ goodwill and the prevention of consumer 
confusion, with the need for both consumers and competitors to reference and use 
others’ trademarks. In the context of publicity rights, the law must balance both the 
need for the public to comment on and refer to public figures with the rights of 
those individuals to control and profit from the use of their identities. How exactly 
one would divide up these rights is a matter of much debate, but most people would 
agree that an optimal allocation of IP rights requires consideration of these 
sometimes competing interests. 
Given this model of optimal IP rules, customary practices on their own are 
not likely to best reflect when exclusive rights should yield to permit access and 
use. Many of the prevalent customs have developed to avoid litigation or preserve 
relationships by avoiding conflict. These practices (such as those of the clearance 
culture) are not developed to be optimal governing rules, but instead simply to 
promote harmony outside of the legal system. The danger of allowing such risk-
averse customs to define the scope of IP rights should be apparent. As discussed, 
incorporating such behavior can greatly expand infringement findings. Industry 
practices can establish a restrictive IP regime—one in which virtually nothing is 
free and no uses are fair. IP owners and users do not view most licensing practices 
and copying guidelines as optimal, nor as an expression of their preferred 
allocations of rights. Instead, even those who routinely license want the latitude to 
contest, and sometimes litigate, when a license is not granted or is prohibitively 
expensive.  
Inequalities in IP markets and the underrepresentation of the public increase 
the likelihood that suboptimal practices will develop. One of the main arguments 
against the incorporation of custom into tort law is that the market cannot 
adequately protect the interests of third parties or the public because they have no 
role in the production of the practices. Even plaintiffs who are in a direct 
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relationship with a potential defendant, such as a consumer for a defective product 
or an employee, may still lack bargaining power or sufficient market options to 
exert pressure on potential tortfeasors. When parties do not have equal bargaining 
power and are not in reciprocal positions, suboptimal practices and norms are likely 
to develop. As Eric Posner has observed in his critique of the reliance on norms as 
a source for legal rules, “once one abandons the unrealistic assumption that parties 
have symmetrical positions, traditional theories of the efficiency of norms lose their 
power” (Posner, 1996, p. 1709). He suggests that “highly unequal endowments of 
group members may be evidence of inefficient norms. The more powerful members 
may prefer and enforce norms that redistribute wealth to them, even when those 
norms are inefficient” (Posner, 1996, p. 1727). 
Incorporation of custom also can prevent the continued evolution of custom 
by producing a lock-in effect—the incorporation of custom further entrenches the 
same suboptimal customs. James Gibson, among others, has identified the troubling 
“doctrinal feedback” and rights accretion that stems from the consideration of 
licensing practices in the context of IP. When courts consider licensing evidence, 
parties are more likely to license, which makes courts more likely to once again 
rely on licensing evidence. As more and more companies and individuals follow 
the licensing and other litigation-avoidance practices, these customs drive 
conformity rather than the evolution of optimal practices (Gibson, 2007, pp. 884-
85; Rothman, 2007, p. 1955). 
Even if various practices are efficient between the parties when weighing 
litigation versus licensing costs, they should not be extrapolated to define IP rights 
more generally or even in future transactions between the same parties. This is 
similar to the situation that arises when parties to a contract wish to be bound by 
gap-filling terms based on custom for efficiency’s sake. These gap-filling terms 
will not bind nonparties or outsiders, and even the parties themselves can opt out 
of the custom in future contracts. 
Some of the scholarly support for preferring custom over congressional and 
court-made law is driven by reasonable concerns over the influence of special 
interest groups in the drafting and passage of legislation. Richard Epstein, for 
example, contends that reliance on custom “provides an effective bulwark against 
[the] bias and corruption” that pervade the legislative system (Epstein, 1992b, p. 
86). Unfortunately, the same powerful parties who often influence legislation often 
also control the creation and development of customary practices. Worse yet, the 
development of industry practices lacks the established procedure for encouraging 
open debate and public commentary that exists in the context of pending legislation. 
As Lloyd Weinreb has observed, the result of reliance on custom is that “the better 
financed private interest” will prevail, rather than that a “careful, systematic” rule 
will develop to “serve the community as a whole” (Weinreb, 1992, pp. 146-47).  
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Many of the practices and norms that I have discussed demonstrate this 
skewed development. The Classroom Guidelines, for example, were negotiated and 
drafted primarily by publishers and therefore unsurprisingly forward the agenda of 
publishing companies rather than those of scholars, educators, students, or research 
institutions. The Guidelines were adopted over the opposition of major universities 
and scholarly organizations, such as the American Association of Law Schools. 
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 72; Basic Books, p. 1535 n.10). Similarly, the clearance 
culture is driven by large corporations.  
To the extent optimal customs have been identified in other areas of law, 
they usually have developed in the context of close-knit communities in which 
community members have ongoing relationships and in which the same types of 
transactions are repeatedly conducted. Richard Epstein (1992b) has advocated that 
“custom should be followed in those cases in which there are repeat and reciprocal 
interactions between the same parties, for then their incentives to reach the correct 
rule are exceedingly powerful” (p. 126). Robert Ellickson (1991) has similarly 
concluded that close-knit communities are most likely to develop welfare-
maximizing norms (pp. 167, 187, 228, 267, 283). Henry Smith (2009), using his 
information-costs model of property law, has also contended that custom’s value 
dissipates outside of the close-knit communities in which it develops because 
parties are no longer familiar with the practices. In criticizing the enforcement of 
norms in the context of the Internet, Mark Lemley (1998) has emphasized that “[i]t 
is no accident that virtually all of the empirical work on norms has taken place in 
small, close-knit communities with little change in membership over time.” As a 
community becomes larger and more diverse, there is less likely to be a 
“commonality of interest” and norms are both less likely to develop and more likely 
to develop without uniform agreement (pp. 1267-69). 
IP markets are exactly these sorts of disaggregated spaces. Many IP 
transactions do not involve repeat players or individuals who have any relationship 
with one another. A documentary filmmaker likely has no relationship with the 
Elvis estate or Disney Studios, and neither Disney nor the Elvis estate are likely to 
subsequently want to license or use any material created by a documentary 
filmmaker. Nor does a person sitting at home making a mix tape, CD, or MP3 
playlist usually have a relationship with particular bands or record companies, other 
than as a generic consumer. Those who argue that the private sector is superior at 
allocating rights because it is free to “independently” develop ideal rules also 
overlook the legal shadow in which IP transactions take place. In the context of IP, 
the governing customs are often generated in response to legal regimes rather than 
on a clean slate. 
Despite such concerns, some, such as Richard Epstein (2007), have argued 
in response to my work, that the reliance on custom in copyright cases involving 
negotiated licenses and other clearance culture practices sometimes does reflect 
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optimal private ordering based on mutually-agreed-upon pricing. Epstein is more 
optimistic than I am that the clearance culture and other private-ordering 
mechanisms will result in optimal delineations of use rights and pricing in the 
context of copyrighted works. Negotiating licensing agreements is challenging, 
especially for smaller players or when a potential user has a limited amount of time 
to obtain permission for the use. Content owners sometimes cannot be located or 
do not respond (or at least not in a timely manner) to requests. These challenges 
lead to significant transaction costs that warp the market for these licenses. Content 
owners sometimes refuse to license at any price or charge a prohibitively high or 
simply unreasonable fee for use. In addition, because copyright furthers the overall 
public interest in generating more works and more knowledge, we cannot simply 
look at an individual transaction and evaluate the optimality between the owner and 
user, as compared to litigation costs—we must also consider the costs to society 
more generally. Optimality in the sense of maximizing wealth is also not the only 
consideration at issue. We must also maximize creativity, knowledge, and liberty. 
In short, custom is unlikely to independently establish optimal allocations of IP, or 
to provide the best balance between the exclusionary rights of owners and the use 
rights of other creators and the public. 
 
B. Expectations Should Not Determine IP Rights 
 
A second justification for incorporating custom is that doing so satisfies 
parties’ expectations. In tort law there has been significant scholarly debate about 
this very issue with regard to the standard for negligence and, in particular, whether 
the negligence standard should be governed by parties’ expectations or by a more 
objective standard. Judge Richard Posner views tort law not as furthering broad 
public policy goals, but instead as a mechanism for fulfilling parties’ expectations 
when no formal contract governs a transaction. “[T]he principle function of tort 
law,” he has written from the bench, “is to protect customers’ reasonable 
expectations that the firms with which they deal are complying with the standard 
of care customary in the industry” (Rodi Yachts v. Nat’l Marine, 1993, p. 889). 
Epstein similarly contends that customary practices should be the standard of 
negligence when parties have some relationship to one another, even when the 
relationship is inequitable, such as between employer and employee and retailer 
and consumer (Epstein, 1992a, pp. 4-5 n.14). 
In the context of tort law, conformity with an industry practice may best 
reflect parties’ expectations, but as a matter of public policy there is concern that 
safety precautions will lag if an expectations or custom-based standard is adopted. 
The fact that a plaintiff was on notice of a danger should not in and of itself end the 
inquiry. Tort law, like IP law, is not another form of contract law in which 
individual parties’ expectations drive the law. Instead, both bodies of law are in 
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service to a higher purpose. Tort liability is not solely about the parties before the 
court but is also about making society safer, protecting third parties, and deterring 
bad or dangerous behavior. Given the bargaining power and knowledge base of 
potential tort victims, it makes sense to protect consumers from the race to the 
bottom that may result from deference solely to industry standards. As a result, in 
most instances tort law requires an objective, external evaluation of what is a 
reasonable standard of care. 
Much of the literature supporting the incorporation of custom into contract 
law reflects the goal of furthering contracting parties’ intentions and expectations. 
It makes sense to incorporate custom into contracts, if it reflects the contracting 
parties’ understanding. As Lisa Bernstein (1999) has noted, however, the mere 
existence of practices does not indicate that parties would expect or want them to 
govern in “end-game” disputes when both a contract and relationship are breached.  
In the context of traditional property rights, scholars have similarly debated 
whether expectations should drive property rights. Property rights often have been 
justified on the basis of expectations of entitlement to particular property. Carol 
Rose (2000a; 2000b) has highlighted, however, that even though a party may expect 
certain property rights, those rights should yield when they are unjust or otherwise 
not deserving of enforcement. Rose emphasizes that expectations must often be 
frustrated to manage or protect scarce resources or to promote social justice, tasks 
that often require limits on property rights (2000a, pp. 485-86; 2000b, pp. 19, 22). 
An analysis of IP law supports the views held by scholars critical of relying 
on expectations-based models for tort, contract, and property law. Neither the 
expectations of IP owners or risk-averse IP users should govern the scope of IP 
rights. Patent and copyright protection are provided by constitutional grant and 
explicitly require consideration of the public interest separate from the property 
rights of IP owners. Copyright and patent laws do not have as their primary purpose 
the promotion of authors’ rights, but instead the promotion of the public interest 
more broadly. The U.S. Constitution expressly states that the “exclusive Right to . 
. . Writings and Discoveries” is granted for the purpose of “promot[ing] the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts” (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). Accordingly, 
courts have often noted that they must “subordinate the copyright [or patent] 
holder’s interest in maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the 
development of art, science and industry.” (Rosemont Enters., p. 307). 
IP law, more so than many other areas of the law, requires consideration of 
negative externalities worked on third parties. An IP holder might expect, especially 
given the clearance culture, that no unlicensed uses would be made of her work, yet 
public policy demands the use of some material for commentary, scholarship, or 
other creative or useful works. If the public or IP owners have a narrow view of the 
scope of IP rights, these expectations should not alter the congressional or 
constitutional judgment about how best to balance IP holders’ rights with the 
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public’s right to use and access IP. For example, the New York Times licenses its 
news stories for use in television shows and movies (Manly, 2006). The Times’ 
expectation that it can extract compensation for news, however, should not alter 
copyright law’s guarantee that facts remain in the public domain.  
The more attenuated nature of the IP markets also suggests that there are 
fewer shared expectations between the likely parties in IP disputes. Most IP cases 
involve parties who have no direct relationship with one another and often no 
shared set of expectations. One only needs to listen to the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office’s roundtables on the legitimacy of mash-ups to see the lack of 
common expectations. Large content-providers, such as Disney, think virtually no 
uses are fair, while some user-focused groups, such as the Organization for 
Transformative Works, think virtually all uses are fair. (Department of Commerce 
Internet Policy Task Force, 2014, pp. 64-142) 
Expectations also are driven by customs and therefore lock in existing 
property regimes, even when they are unjust and even if the parties would prefer 
alternative rules. In sum, furthering parties’ expectations does not justify the 
wholesale incorporation of custom into IP law. 
 
C. Autonomy Interests Do Not Justify Reliance on Custom 
 
The final common justification for incorporating custom is the furtherance 
of autonomy interests. Early justifications for the common law expressed a 
preference for communities being governed by their own customary laws that had 
evolved over a period of time. These laws not only furthered parties’ expectations, 
but also promoted self-governance and autonomy in a world that otherwise was 
dominated by rules instituted by the monarchy without any community input. 
Today, the democratic process allows communities to contribute in a more orderly 
fashion to the creation of governing laws, so there is less of a need to rely on private 
ordering to protect citizens in the law-making process. 
Most importantly, autonomy interests do not support reliance on custom 
because there are conflicting autonomy interests at stake. It is not just initial 
creators and inventors who have autonomy interests. Users, and subsequent creators 
and inventors also have liberty and autonomy-based interests. In the context of 
copyright, for example, copyrighted works become a part of the personal and 
cultural world of others. The autonomy interests of an author must therefore 
sometimes yield to the competing autonomy and liberty-based interests of her 
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V. Valuing Custom 
 
The foregoing analysis suggests that custom should rarely, if ever, be 
dispositive of questions involving the scope of IP rights. Nevertheless, custom may 
provide some guidance about what is reasonable or appropriate in a particular 
context. In the past, I have developed six vectors that courts and scholars should 
consider when evaluating practices or norms in the context of IP (Rothman, 2007, 
pp. 1967-80). Here, I will focus only on four primary areas of evaluation: (1) the 
certainty of the custom; (2) the motivation for the custom; (3) the representativeness 
of the custom; and (4) the implications of adopting the custom. 
 
A. Certainty of the Custom 
 
To have any value, a custom must be identifiable, in terms of what 
constitutes the practice itself, and the practice must be widely accepted and 
followed. This analysis tracks the traditional common law requirement that 
practices be certain before meriting judicial consideration (Blackstone, 1765, *78; 
Browne, 1875, pp. 21-24; Lawson, 1881, pp. 32-36, Rothman, 2013). Several 
considerations help to evaluate how certain a particular custom is. First, if there is 
unanimity as to the contours of the custom among diverse parties it is more likely 
to exist and to have definable boundaries. Such agreement about the practice also 
likely indicates the consent of the community. Second, customs that are 
longstanding are more stable and have weathered the test of time. 
Because the best practices statements, such as the Filmmakers’ Statement, 
are more wishful than descriptive and have fuzzy boundaries, they are not 
particularly certain. Although the best practices statements purport to set forth the 
practices of the relevant communities, they instead set forth what the drafters think 
the community should be doing. In the context of the Filmmakers’ Statement, the 
report leading up to the statement and the statement itself both reveal that the 
dominant practice was to license or cut out copyrighted materials from 
documentaries. Additionally, many of the inquiries in the Filmmakers’ Statement 
and other best practices statements do not provide certain guidelines. Instead, they 
leave the same ambiguities of the existing fair use system, but add an additional 
layer of complexity to the already convoluted fair use analysis. For example, the 
OpenCourseWare Code requires evaluations of whether the “extent of the use is 
appropriate,” quotes are no “longer than necessary” and attribution is “reasonably 
possible” (Center for Social Media, 2009, pp. 13-14). 
In other instances, conflicting customs are at work. For example, in the Roy 
Export case—in which a court rejected fair use and First Amendment defenses for 
the use of clips of Charlie Chaplin films in a TV obituary of Chaplin—the court 
rejected fair use on the basis that the defendant did not conform to custom. The 
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court failed to consider, however, that there was more than one custom at work. 
Clips were not usually licensed for obituaries even though they were often licensed 
in other contexts for news projects with more lead time or in scripted series. Such 
conflicting customs suggest either that the court needed to more carefully scrutinize 
which custom was applicable or that there was no single, dominant, and widely-
accepted custom worthy of consideration. 
 
B. Motivation for Custom 
 
Although motivation was not a common law limit on custom; custom was 
long thought to reflect the preferences of a particular community. In other words, 
if the community had been asked to sit around and agree to what the rule should be, 
this is likely the rule they would have come up with—or at least if such a rule had 
been suggested to them they would have agreed to it. In the context of copyright, 
the most valuable practices and norms reflect preferred allocations between 
copyright holders and users, rather than litigation-avoidance or relationship-
preservation strategies. Reactive and risk-averse customs, like those of the 
clearance culture, are not the sort of aspirational, independently developed customs 
that we should adopt.  
When customs develop with aspirational motives they are better indications 
of what is appropriate. In the context of fair use, practices and norms should 
primarily be relevant only to the extent that they are indicative of what is actually 
deemed “fair” by the relevant community, rather than what that community thinks 
is colorable or safe under the law, or simply “cheaper.”  
When considering the motivation for a particular custom, courts should 
particularly identify whether the custom was intended to provide a reasonable 
balance between competing interests. As a check on this analysis, courts should 
independently evaluate whether reasonable people would agree to such rules if they 
knew neither whether they would be powerful or minor players in the market, nor 




Customs that represent only one party’s or one group’s interests are suspect. 
By contrast, when a custom develops with input and participation of both owners 
and users, and large and small players, it is more valuable. Practices and norms 
should also only apply to those within the community that developed them. The 
Classroom Guidelines and best practices statements were both developed in an 
unrepresentative way. They are therefore less valuable guidelines and should not 
be wielded against those who did not participate (or at least were not represented) 
in their development. Like the Classroom Guidelines, none of the best practices’ 
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statements included representation by the most affected parties—the content 
providers whose work is most likely to be appropriated. The fact that some of the 
participating users were also authors does not remedy this one-sidedness. Even 
though the Department of Commerce has stated its support of such use guidelines 
in theory, it has appropriately noted that such guidelines need to be developed with 
the participation of a variety of parties on different sides of the issues before such 
guidelines deserve serious consideration (Department of Commerce Internet Policy 
Task Force, 2013, p. 23). Although the proponents of the best practices statements 
are likely correct that if they invite major content owners to participate very little 
would be agreed to, the fact that the parties cannot agree to any common principles 
should raise serious flags about using the best practices statements to affect 
entitlements outside of the community that developed them. Even within various 
use communities, there have been reasonable objections to applying the standards 
against any party who was not directly involved in their development (Rothman, 




Courts must also independently scrutinize the implications of adopting any 
customary practice or norm as a legal rule. When evaluating the worth of a 
particular custom, a court must consider what the end result of incorporating that 
custom would be. If followed to its logical conclusion, will the custom result in a 
slippery slope, such that no uses will be allowed, or, alternatively, that too many 
uses will be allowed? Consider, for example, two extremes. If it is customary to 
license everything, then no fair uses remain. On the flipside, consider the peak of 
peer-to-peer file-sharing in which the custom was not to pay for any music 
downloaded from the Internet. Such a custom could destroy the market for music 
online. 
In the best practices statement related to user-generated content (“UGC”) 
(in the context of online video) virtually any use is deemed fair because the 
commentary and critique category is read very broadly. In the report supporting the 
Online Video Code, the drafters suggest that a mash-up titled Clint Eastwood’s 
“The Office”—which mixed together clips from the television series The Office 
with the movie Evan Almighty—falls within the favored category of negative or 
critical commentary. This category and its exemplars suggest that all mash-ups are 
fair (Center for Social Media, 2008, pp. 7-9). This means that there can be no 
market for licensing such mash-ups; a conclusion that limits new media markets 
and makes copyright law largely irrelevant in the context of UGC. Many mash-ups 
may well be fair ones, but one cannot simply wish them all to be so. 
In sum, if custom is certain, representative, motivated by aspirational 
purposes, and would result in a reasonable allocation of use and ownership rights, 
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then that custom provides meaningful guidance. Otherwise, such practices and 
norms should be met with skepticism and little deference. 
 
VI. Lessons for IP Policy 
 
Despite the many reasons discussed to be cautious about jumping on the 
custom bandwagon, custom provides a number of lessons for IP policy. First, 
massive disobedience of IP laws can signal market failure or overreaching by IP 
owners. The IP system needs public buy-in to work. Public support requires people 
to think that on some level the law is fair. When laws are wildly out of sync with 
community practices, there sometimes will be value in interpreting the law to 
conform to those understandings or amending the laws to better reflect some of 
those norms.  
Second, customary uses may demonstrate a consensus about preferred 
rights that may not currently be recognized under the law. Such locations of 
commonality are promising areas for legislation. For example, many norms in the 
copyright world favor giving attribution to authors when their work is used, but the 
law does not generally recognize such a right. Similarly, it may be worth addressing 
the potential conflict between the work-for-hire provision and the widely accepted 
norms of faculty ownership of scholarship and teaching materials.  
Third, custom may demonstrate areas of need by users and creators that 
should be accommodated either through a reasonable market mechanism or through 
fair use. Finally, because the value of custom is based on its reflection of a 
commonly-agreed-upon norm, it is important to dissent from dominant and 
restrictive practices in IP markets. 
Although IP laws should continue to provide room for private ordering, 
these private efforts should not alter IP’s boundaries. The clearance culture in the 
publishing and film worlds should not influence courts’ independent analyses of 
whether particular uses are fair. Nor should a small cross-section of documentary 
filmmakers decide when fair use applies in that context. Creative Commons 
licenses can encourage the use of copyrighted works in ways that creators support, 
but the fact that a use breaches such a license should not weigh against a finding of 
fair use.  
Recent scholarship has turned a prying eye on the worlds of fashion, chefs, 
comedians, roller derby, fan fiction, and many other IP-based or IP-adjacent 
communities in which creativity sometimes flourishes without reliance on the 
governing formal IP structures (Raustiala and Sprigman, 2006; Fauchart and von 
Hippel, 2008; Fagundes, 2012; Tushnet, 2007; Madison et al., 2010). Sometimes 
these industries are categorized as producing “creativity without law” and used to 
support arguments that creativity can take place without needing IP rights and 
enforcement (Darling and Perzanowski, 2017). But the law influences even these 
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purportedly IP-free zones. The scope of IP laws determines when and how 
alternative protection schemes develop. Aspects of recipes not protected by 
copyright law will by necessity be protected by alternative mechanisms—such as 
attribution enforced by shaming. Fashion designs that are not protected by 
trademark or copyright law will be protected through other mechanisms or will be 
altered (for example, through a cycle of rapid change, or so they can obtain 
trademark or copyright protection). Those within communities that use alternative 
regimes to protect their creations do not always shun more formal IP protection. 
Roller derby players, for example, use a community-based registry of derby names, 
but also try to register their names with the Patent and Trademark Office when they 
become better known, and such registrations have also become more common as 
roller derby has become more popular. Chefs and comedians sometimes rely on 
copyright law, when they write cookbooks and produce recordings of their routines 
(Fauchart and Von Hippel, 2008; Oliar and Sprigman, 2008). The norms of these 
various communities develop with an awareness of IP law, operate in its shadow, 
and often are efforts to work around its contours. 
As we look back on nearly a decade of robust attention to custom, norms, 
and practices in the context of intellectual goods and IP laws, and celebrate many 
of them, it is important to contextualize them in the broader framework of the 
interplay of law with these extralegal activities. Those who favor expansive use 
rights cannot simply point to all the practices that they like without acknowledging 
the practices that they do not like—those that promote owners’ interests—as well 
as the way courts have long considered custom. Courts are just as likely—often 
more likely—to incorporate restrictive practices (such as clearance culture norms 
and restrictive use guidelines, like the Classroom Guidelines) rather than more 
permissive ones. To the extent that we want to distinguish between customs, we 
cannot do so based on a gut instinct about which practices are preferable. Instead, 
a detailed framework like the one set forth here must be used to evaluate the worth 
of each custom to determine if it merits incorporation into the law. 
As the project of documenting norms in various creator, inventor and user 
communities continues, it would be helpful to gather data about what knowledge 
or awareness (accurate or not) community members have about the law and to what 
extent those understandings influence their practices and norms. It would also be 
useful to collect information about whether the characteristics that make custom 
more or less worthy of consideration are present. For example, are the practices 
uniformly known, certain, and longstanding? Are the practices motivated by efforts 
to set appropriate boundaries for use and ownership, or by risk-aversion, 
relationship-preservation, or wishful thinking (by owners or users)? Are the 
practices representative of a variety of parties, or only of one particular group? 
Custom can provide valuable information, but its usefulness depends on 
independently evaluating the worthiness of the custom and particularly scrutinizing 
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its reasonableness. The unarticulated incorporation of custom threatens to swallow 
up IP law and replace it with industry-led IP regimes that give the public and other 
creators more limited rights to access and use IP. If we take seriously the notion 
that IP is protected in the public interest, then we cannot abdicate the boundaries of 
IP rights to delineation by privately developed customary practices. This does not 
mean that we cannot appreciate community norms that have developed in the IP 
space; but it does demonstrate that we cannot simply bask in their glory without 
recognizing their place in a larger ecosystem of custom in the IP world and beyond.
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